A rare Second World War ‘Persian Gulf’ D.S.C. group of twelve awarded to Captain R. E. T. Tunbridge, Royal Naval Reserve, later Senior Officer of the African Coastal Flotilla, engaged in clandestine boating operations on behalf of Combined Operations, SOE, MI9, OSS and other organisations

Distinguished Service Cross, G.VI.R., the reverse officially dated 1942; 1914-15 Star (S.Lt., R.N.R.); British War and Victory Medals (Lieut., R.N.R.); 1939-45 Star; Atlantic Star; Africa Star; Burma Star; War Medal; Jubilee 1935; Coronation 1937; Royal Naval Reserve Decoration, G.V.R., good very fine (12) £1200-1500

D.S.C. London Gazette 10 March 1942: ‘For courage, enterprise and devotion to duty in operations in the Persian Gulf.’ Awarded for Operation Countenance in September 1941, the main objective of which was the seizure of the Abadan Oil Refinery and occupation of the Haft-I-Khel Oilfields. Operation Countenance in fact comprised of three simultaneous operations, of which Tunbridge was a part of Operation Crackler, the embarkation at Basra of the 24th Indian Brigade in Naval craft, their transport down the river Shatt-Al-Arab for 32 miles to Avadan, and the support of the landing on that island. The operation also involved the destruction or capture of the Persian sloop Palang berthed at Abadan.

Whilst the landing operations were under way, Tunbridge brought H.M.S. Shoreham up form Fao and opened fire on the Palang at No. 11 jetty. The first salvo unfortunately caused a large fire and although gunfire was checked, the risk of the fire spreading was too great, and Tunbridge decided that it was necessary, owing to her nearness to the refinery, to sink her, which he duly did. Throughout the day Shoreham was moving up and down the river using her 0.5 machine gun to engage Persian troops along the jetties and from time to time firing a well directed 4-inch to remove an annoying post from a housetop. The whole refinery was in Allied hands by evening and although the Persian posts along the river front had fought with such tenacity and in many cases literally to the last man, the main body of Persian troops fled during the night, and the not inconsiderable garrisons of Khosrowabad and Qasbah at the south end of the island also withdrew across the Bahmanshir River. Enquiries of the villagers next day as to the reason for this precipitate withdrawal all gave the Naval gunfire and sinking of the Palang as the main cause of the consternation.

M.I.D. London Gazette 2 January 1945: ‘For gallantry, enterprise and undaunted devotion to duty in hazardous operations.’ The official recommendation states, ‘These Officers and men have carried out a number of perilous secret operations in enemy held territory, mainly in France, Italy and the Adriatic...The work of the African Coastal Flotilla, particularly during the winter of 1943-44 when the clandestine organisations were preparing for the campaigns of 1944, has been of inestimable importance.’

The ‘African Coastal Flotilla’ was the cover name for the Navy’s clandestine boating organisation, formed to co-ordinate secret operations on behalf of Combined Operations, SOE, MI9, and various other Allied ‘irregular’ organisations, in the Mediterranean theatre. The ACF reported directly to the Deputy Director of the Operations Division (Irregular) (DDOD(I)), a retired naval officer who had been seconded from the Secret Intelligence Service to the Admiralty to take charge of the clandestine sea operations involved in restoring our shattered intelligence organisations in enemy-occupied Europe. In every clandestine operation the ACF officer was the key figure, the man in charge, who alone knew where ‘Joeys’ were to be landed and was responsible for navigation to and from the pinpoint. The ACF had their own surfboat crews, who were always used on operations, except those conducted on behalf of SOE, who preferred to take along their own men. All volunteers, they were a mixed collection of ratings recruited by DDOD(I) from various sources. Many of their exploits are told in Undercover Sailors - Secret Operations of World War II by A. Cecil Hampshire.

The important part played by Captain Tunbridge in the story of the ACF is best told in the words of the DDOD(I) himself. In a remarkable strongly worded attachment to the recommendation for Tunbridge’s MID, he states:

‘In connection with the attached list of recommendations for honours and awards to the personnel of the ACF, DDOD(I) desires to submit the work of Captain Tunbridge to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

Captain Tunbridge succeeded to the command of the African Coastal Flotilla in the spring of 1943 at a time when the fortunes of the flotilla were at a low ebb and the morale of the personnel lowered by the absence of active operations, and the difficulties in obtaining well found ships and suitable equipment. In the face of the overwhelming requirements of regular operations, no priority could be granted to the flotilla in its struggles to effect repairs to the ancient craft available, and no consideration could be given towards the provision of more suitable craft. Moreover, the prestige of the flotilla had been damaged by the depredations of “private navies” operating in the Mediterranean before the advent of DDOD(I). The zealous but unconstitutional conduct of the sponsors of the “private navies” had alienated the sympathy and understanding of local naval authorities who at best regarded irregular operations with amused tolerance and ridicule, or at the worst with impatience and hostility.

Captain Tunbridge therefore, fresh from the relatively straightforward business of the sea, was faced with a formidable task with at first nothing to help him beyond directives and signals and letters of encouragement from DDOD(I) coupled with periodical personal visits from the latter and as much equipment as DDOD(I) could scrape together in the UK.

In the sixteen months Captain Tunbridge has been in command he has, with the assistance of the Commander-in-Chief’s staff, not only succeeded in building up a highly efficient force, but has restored the confidence of the flotilla in its work; has overcome the prejudices of local naval authorities, with the result that the flotilla now enjoys the maximum assistance in its work, and, above all, Captain Tunbridge has succeeded in removing the convictions of the clandestine authorities in the Mediterranean (since they have been largely deprived of their private navies) that the formation of the African Coastal Flotilla would hamper rather than advance their interests.

This last achievement has been won at the expense of an outwardly strictly neutral attitude to all clandestine authorities and the exercise of exceptional patience, cunning and tact, for such is the ‘prima donna’-like temperament of those engaged on underground or subversive activities that had the slightest preference been shown to one more than the other (except as ordered by Allied Forces HQ) the competitors would have immediately seized the opportunity as an excuse to re-embark on private sea-going enterprises, chaos would have again resulted and the just prejudices of local naval authorities never overcome.

Thus it will be seen that Captain Tunbridge in addition to his ability as an organiser and seaman has won a diplomatic victory, and it has been necessary for DDOD(I) to set down the record of his achievements in forceful rather than tactful language in order to emphasise this latter point.’