Orders, Decorations, Medals and Militaria

Pair: Corporal R. Halpin, Gloucestershire Regiment, taken Prisoner of War at the Battle of Imjin River, 26 April 1951, who was one of the small section of men under Lieutenant Philip Curtis ordered to attack an enemy machine-gun post on ‘Castle Hill’, 23 April 1951, for which Curtis was later awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross- Halpin was one of three men who helped carry Curtis to cover after he was wounded, before Curtis again attacked, and with his final act silenced the enemy machine-gun post

Korea 1950-53, 1st issue (22210064 Pte R. Halpin. Glosters.); U.N. Korea 1950-54, unnamed as issued; together with a United States of America Presidential Unit Citation riband bar, and the recipient’s related miniature awards, nearly extremely fine (2) £1400-1800

Provenance: Dix Noonan Webb, September 2006.

Robert Halpin was born in his family home at 176 Chorley Road, Westhoughton near Horwich, Lancashire on 12 September 1927, moved with his family to Kent shortly after his birth. A miner by trade, he enlisted in the East Kent Regiment in March 1948, and had served a full period of National Service before his re-enlistment on the outbreak of the Korean War. Promoted fairly quickly, on the eve of the Battle of Imjin River Halpin was section commander of 1 Section in 1 Platoon, A Company, Gloucestershire Regiment.

The Battle of Imjin River
‘Colonel Carne had given much thought to the deployment of the 1st Gloucesters. His front was over nine miles long. Two defiles through the hills had to be covered and the mass of hills to the south of the river, dominated by the Kamaksan feature, presented a deployment problem for his artillery. His primary aim was to cover the approaches to the northern end of the defile through the hills as they offered the Chinese the quickest means of reaching the flatter country to the south. A Company, the forward most company of the Glosters were located on a hill, 148 metres high at it highest point. This position covered the main crossing point on the river 2,000 metres to the north. On the top of the hill, centuries before, a castle had stood. This prominent feature became known as 'Castle Hill'. By 1951 nothing remained of the fortifications except the hint of walls where low mounds encircled the summit. This part of the hill was known as the 'Castle Site' or Point 148. 'A' Company commander, Major Angier, had decided that he would keep his platoons within supporting distance of each other on Castle Hill. Using the Castle site as a centre the surrounding terrain and defensive positions can be described thus.
Five hundred metres out to the north, a small hillock, like a knuckle, sat on top of the spur. This finger ridge sloped down towards the lmjin for about a kilometre and could offer an enemy a narrow but relatively gentle route up Castle Hill. To the east lay a much shorter spur overlooking the village of Choksong. On the forward edge of this spur was a rectangular bunker built during an earlier military occupation and recently refurbished by American engineers as an OP. From this vantage point General Ridgeway was scheduled to observe the hills north of the river. He never visited the site. The OP had been constructed with a roof, a number of horizontal slit windows and a doorway on the south facing side accessible via some steps. This bunker was to be the scene of some exceptionally bitter fighting. Again on this eastern side was a re-entrant, sheltered within lay the remains of an old Korean temple with its characteristic sloping tiled roof and one or two small, deserted houses. This cluster was some 120 metres from the OP bunker and 200 metres from the summit of Castle Hill. It was to be in this general area, under command of 2nd Lt. John Maycock, that 2 Platoon were sited to become the right-hand forward platoon. They faced the northern spur, overlooked Choksong village and were responsible for the defence of the Castle Site. If this position were overrun the rest of the company positions would prove untenable. To occupy the OP bunker would have been stretching his platoon so barbed wire was laid between it and the nearest 2 Platoon position. Barbed wire was short across the whole front. Both A and D Companies had been given the greater share allocated to the Glosters but it was sufficient only for a single coil round each platoon. 2nd Lt. Maycock’s platoon was thought to be short of its usual complement of 30 men but included a number of men (possibly 4) under command of Lt Bruce Hudson from 70 Battery OP Party because of the excellent views north.
To the left of 2 Platoon was sited 2nd Lt. Terry Waters and 3 Platoon, tasked with defending an area from the north-west all the way round to the south west. Directly to the west another narrow spur ended in a low knoll 600 metres from Castle Hill; beyond it, 2,000 metres away the lmjin River again. This finger would be worrying as like that to the north, it offered a possible enemy approach to the main position. Some 900 metre away, below this finger and its adjoining re-entrant was the tiny hamlet of Komsang in the rice paddies at the foot of the hill. To the rear of A Company's position were situated about 1,000 metres of rice fields criss-crossed with footpaths. The fields served to separate Castle Hill from the mountains that stretched across the horizon and would restrict any passage southwards. Overlooking this terrain were sited Lt. Philip Curtis and the men of 1 Platoon who would cover the rear on both flanks and act as a counter attack force should either of the two forward platoons be overrun. Here were sited the two Vickers from 3 Section of the MMG Platoon. Major Angier also positioned his headquarters close to 1 Platoon to enable him to control both forward platoons in battle.
First reports of enemy movement in front of 2 and 3 Platoons were arriving at A Company HQ around 2200, 22nd April. By 0200 hours (23rd April) the enemy had established themselves in strength on the forward slopes with fierce attacks soon following. It has been reported that the Chinese were queuing up under the shoulder of the hill to assault in almost 'suicidal' waves. Casualties soon mounted particularly in 2 Platoon. Fighting became hand to hand-burp guns, bayonet and grenades being used by both defenders and attackers as they grappled for possession of each trench. These attacks were pressed more strongly between 0600 and 0700. In these early morning hours the summit of Castle Hill was lost to the enemy. It became clear to Major Angier that, despite a magnificent defence, 2 Platoon was in serious trouble. With part of their position overrun, ammunition was low and only a fraction of the platoon remained unscathed. The enemy had established one or more machine-guns up near the crest of the Castle Site and were now able to cover their attacks with accurate supporting fire from this key feature. With the Castle Site lost the chances of making a clean withdrawal should one be ordered would be highly unlikely
An '0' Group was held at approximately 0500 during which Angier told Curtis that he was to mount a counter-attack on to Castle Site at first light. At dawn Curtis got his men out of their trenches and formed them up in extended line. It was relatively quiet with no firing on either the Castle Site or 3 Platoons location. Curtis looked left and right, shouted 'fix bayonets' paused briefly as the thirty or so bayonets clicked on to rifles, then stood up to give the order 'advance'. In a time honoured vignette of British Infantry they advanced at the walk across the 250 m to the Castle Hill site. Number 1 section under Cpl Halpin was the forward right section, on the left 2 Section with Curtis his radio operator and runner in between them. Slightly to the rear and in the centre followed 3 section and Sgt N Tuggey. Norman Tuggey takes up the story:-
"The left forward section moved to the NW ridge, and I went forward with them. it was all quiet, and we just stood looking down the slope and wondering, I suppose, what had created such a shindig throughout the night. Its difficult to say how long we stood there, not knowing quite what to make of it, when suddenly the Chinese stood up from behind the bushes they were carrying. The distance between us and their most forward troops was just a few yards and their numbers frightening".
A fierce fire-fight erupted leaving Curtis with two immediate problems. A real danger that the enemy would quickly infiltrate round his exposed right flank existed. Secondly they were receiving fire from the OP bunker. It is believed three men of the platoon were killed and four wounded at this time. Curtis ordered Tuggey and the reserve 3 Section to find a position to the right of the Castle Site from which they could engage any enemy coming up the eastern slopes from Choksong. This left Curtis to deal with the OP Bunker.
Gathering a group from 1 Section including Robert Halpin, Curtis worked his way, under intense fire, to a fold in the ground only 20 metres from the OP bunker. Private Sam Mercer was also a member of this 'winkle group' and confirmed that Halpin was also a member of this small group (letter from Private Sam Mercer, included in the lot, refers). Curtis began to hurl grenades that were passed to him at the aperture. The response from the machine gun was immediate. It poured burst after burst into the area of 1 Section forcing them to crawl back to better cover. Not so Curtis, he remained continually exposing himself to throw more grenades until a bullet struck him in the head leaving him to lie exposed within a few metres of the objective. Gallantly two or three of his men, some accounts state that it was Robert Halpin, L/Cpl H M Mairs, a veteran of the Burma campaign, and Private Sam Mercer, wriggled up to drag him under cover. Corporal Cyril Papworth RAMC attended to the struggling Curtis. Curtis's men, again including Halpin, Mairs and Mercer, sought to restrain their platoon commander when he strove to get up to continue the attack. Major Angier, who had followed 1 Platoon up, also tried to reassure him as Papworth bandaged his head with a field dressing. Several hands held Curtis down; one soldier resorted to sitting on the wounded officer, so desperate were they to restrain him. Despite this Curtis broke free and moved into the attack for the second time. Hurling grenades he lurched the last few metres towards the still firing machine-gun. A few yards from the bunker he fell, mortally wounded in the stomach, the moment a grenade left his hand. The machine-gun was silenced, thus enabling the remainder of the Platoon to clear the Castle Site. The Chinese made no further effort to exploit their success in this immediate area; had they had done so, the eventual withdrawal of the company might well have proved impossible. Curtis was carried back to shelter by his men, still alive, but only just. Papworth arrived but there was nothing he could do to save him, he died in the arms of the soldiers who brought him down the slope.
When asked to reflect why Philip Curtis pushed home the second attack when, with a serious head wound, he had more than fulfilled his duty already Private Sam Mercer recalled "We soon realised that he was inclined to lead from the front with a rifle, if he could get one, rather than a revolver. Within the platoon it was generally felt that the first trouble we hit we would lose him" (letter from Private Sam Mercer, included in the lot, refers). It was not until Tuesday 1st December 1953 that the award of the Victoria Cross was announced in the London Gazette. The long delay was due to the living witnesses like Cpl Halpin being held as prisoners for over two years. These were men like Private Ward and Corporal Roy Masters who both made sworn statements and most importantly Colonel Carne who instigated the procedure for the VC on his own repatriation.’ (extracts from At War in Korea by George Forty; The Imjin Roll by Colonel E. D. Harding, D.S.O.; and The Last Eleven? by Mark Adkin refer, all of which mention Halpin’s action, refer.)

Halpin was taken prisoner of war following the lmjin River engagement, one of 21 officers and 501 men of the Gloucestershire Regiment captured by the Chinese at the Battle of Imjin River. He was released from captivity along with 74 other Prisoners of War on 18 August 1953, and finally arrived back in Southampton on 28 October 1953. Following his service in the army he worked as an animal technician with a pharmaceutical manufacturer. He died at the Pilgrims Hospice in Thanet, Kent, on 11 February 2001.

Sold together with a hand-written letter from Private Sam Mercer, which makes mention of Halpin’s role; various copied newspaper articles; and other copied research.