Orders, Decorations, Medals and Militaria

The rare ‘Selous Scouts’ Legion of Merit and Bronze Cross of Rhodesia group of three awarded to Colour-Sergeant Lameck Chiyaka, Selous Scouts, an original member of the ‘Experimental Teams’ formed under the aegis of the Rhodesian Special Branch and Army to explore the potential of ‘Pseudo-gang’ false flag operations and adapt them into a highly effective means of combating communist insurgency; Chiyaka worked with the legendary trio of Andre Rabie, ‘Stretch’ Franklin and Basil Moss and then, like them, became a Founder Member of the renowned Selous Scouts, serving for the entire time that this elite regiment existed and being decorated for gallantry both in classic Selous Scouts actions and when leading a daring and most successful cross-border raid into Botswana which resulted in the capture (and subsequent interrogation) of the entire command structure of ZIPRA’s Southern Front; only one other member of the Selous Scouts was awarded this combination of gallantry awards

Rhodesia, Order of the Legion of Merit (M.L.M.), Military Division Member’s (Combatant’s) breast badge, bronze, silver-plate and enamel, unnamed as issued, in original case of issue; Bronze Cross of Rhodesia (B.C.R.) (644718 L/Cpl L. Chiyaka); General Service Medal (R44718 Pte. Rameck); together with original award certificate for second medal, nearly extremely fine (3) £5,000-£7,000

Member of the Legion of Merit (Operational), date of award 12 December 1979.
The Citation states: ‘The increasing use of Botswana by ZIPRA terrorists as a springboard to Rhodesia resulted in the Selous Scouts being tasked to eliminate the ZIPRA command structure based in Francistown, Botswana. To achieve this aim, a Selous Scout detachment, disguised as Botswana Defence Force personnel, moved into Francistown by vehicle at 0045 hours on 12 April 1979. Colour Sergeant Chiyaka, dressed and equipped as a lieutenant of the Botswana Defence Force, led the snatch group into Francistown whilst a back-up group waited on the outskirts of Francistown. The snatch group, led by Colour Sergeant Chiyaka and accompanied by a recently captured ZIPRA terrorist, proceeded to the ZIPRA headquarters house, where Colour Sergeant Chiyaka demanded and gained entry through the security gate fence, from an unarmed sentry. Colour Sergeant Chiyaka then gained entry into the house on the pretext that a contact had taken place between his troops and a group of ZIPRA terrorists during which the Botswana Defence Force had suffered a casualty. Looking suitably angry, Colour Sergeant Chiyaka told the occupants of the house that he wished to search the premises for arms and ammunition. He pointed at a bed and ordered his sergeant (644777 Lance-Corporal David Ndhlovu) to strip it. A loaded folding-butt AK assault rifle was discovered under the pillow. Expressing great indignation, Colour Sergeant Chiyaka ordered the arrest of the entire group that occupied the house. Colour Sergeant Chiyaka’s attitude and demeanour was such that the occupants hastened to obey and the ZIPRA leader actually put his wrists together to be handcuffed by a Selous Scout without even being told to do so. The occupants of the house, 17 in number, were captured without a shot being fired and brought back to Rhodesia. Amongst those captured was Makepesi Tshuma, the commander of ZIPRA’s Southern Front, and Elliott Mpofu, the overall commander of Urban Operations. Information obtained from these two persons resulted in a substantial arms cache being uplifted in the area of Manaka village, south of Plumtree. The operation was a total success for, in addition to removing almost the entire ZIPRA command structure from Botswana, it also gave the Rhodesian Special Branch a tremendous volume of intelligence in the way of top-ranking terrorists and a vast number of documents from the headquarters. The success of this operation can very largely be attributed to Colour Sergeant Chiyaka whose resourcefulness, initiative and bravery were outstanding.’

Bronze Cross of Rhodesia, date of investiture 17 November 1975.
The Citation states: ‘Lance-Corporal Chiyaka, a serving member of the Selous Scouts, was deployed as a member of a patrol, in the border area of north-eastern Rhodesia, during May 1974. Contact was made with the local ZANU chairman who in turn arranged for a meeting with a terrorist group numbering six. Lance-Corporal Chiyaka took a patrol out and in due course met up with three terrorists. The three terrorists were armed and were waiting in an extended line. Lance-Corporal Chiyaka with two members of his patrol went forward and met them. He was asked various passwords and certain background information, which he answered to the satisfaction of the terrorists. At this stage, darkness had fallen and the terrorist leader, a man named Hope Zichirira, suggested that the party moved to a fire in the village to hold a discussion. Both groups then moved into the village and seated themselves around the fire. ZANU songs were sung and the terrorist leader, Hope Zichirira, made an address of welcome to the “new” comrades. On the completion of this, Lance-Corporal Chiyaka got up and made a speech in reply. As he ended his speech he ordered his men to seize the terrorists. A violent struggle ensued; this was broken up when the remainder of the terrorist group that, unknown to Lance-Corporal Chiyaka, had taken up an ambush position outside the village, opened fire, killing one of Lance-Corporal Chiyaka’s patrol and wounding a further two. Two of the terrorists were immediately shot dead by Lance-Corporal Chiyaka’s patrol whilst the third terrorist made good his escape. Hope Zichirira, the terrorist leader, was one of the dead. Intelligence revealed that Hope Zichirira plus five terrorists, had been tasked by Nhari to recce and to programme the Pfungwe and Ngarwe areas for a large-scale incursion, later in the year. Lance-Corporal Chiyaka displayed courage and initiative of a high order and very nearly effected the capture of an important terrorist leader. In addition to this, valuable intelligence was gained as to future terrorist intentions in the Ngarwe/Pfungwe areas. During December of 1974, Lance-Corporal Chiyaka was deployed in the northwest of Rhodesia. Lance-Corporal Chiyaka and two members of the Selous Scouts were tasked with penetrating a ZAPU cell, this they accomplished most successfully and, in the process, recovered an arms cache containing 21 weapons (AK and SKS), mines and ammunition. Three cell leaders of the local ZAPU organisation were captured and the names of 30 locally trained terrorists were obtained and given over to Special Branch.’

This combination of gallantry awards is one of only two awarded to the Selous Scouts and is thus rare to the Regiment.

Lameck Chiyaka was probably born in the early 1950s In the Fort Victoria region. He enlisted in the regular Rhodesian African Rifles in 1970, after a period of prior service with the security forces (hence his regimental number changed from R44718 to 644718). Available records suggest that from 4 January 1971 Chiyaka was part of the Army Combat Tracker Wing, which at that time was a sub-unit of the School of Infantry. Having been appointed a young Lance-Corporal, in 1973 Chiyaka volunteered for operational tracking duties in the north-eastern border area (Operation Hurricane).

Service in the Experimental Teams – “First class material, in fact, second to none”
In December 1972, the Rhodesian security forces were faced with new tactics adopted by the Chinese-sponsored ZANLA/ ZAPU insurgents. After carrying out their attacks, the terrorists no longer went to ground in bush camps in either uninhabited areas (the Rhodesians had become expert at tracking them and destroying them in their camps) or villages and towns (where Special Branch informers would indicate their presence). There was nothing for the security forces to go on - no tracks and no information. It was clear that the insurgents had learnt Mao’s lessons and had indoctrinated and merged with the local African population, none of whom were willing to provide information.

Experienced and realistic Special Branch officers were keen to experiment with the use of pseudo teams (friendly forces disguised as and pretending to be insurgents). Brigadier Hickman, the commander of Joint Operations Centre Hurricane, was an enthusiastic supporter. Three teams were set up by the army and another by the Special Branch, combining security force personnel with insurgent captives who had changed sides. The Special Branch had several captured terrorists who had been ‘turned’ by a standard, simple and quick method: the capture was treated well in respect of being fed and his wounds treated, and was interviewed to determine if he could prove useful if he indeed changed sides. If the conclusion was positive, he was told that he had two options. One was to processed by the police, who would prosecute him for offences under the provision of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act which would result in being hanged; the other was to change sides and work against his former comrades. If, after a short period of intense contemplation, the capture decided to change sides, he was immediately given back his weapon, which astonished and bemused him (the firing pin had been secretly removed). Henceforth he would be kept out of sight, as a secret withheld from both the rest of Special Branch and from the military. He would be paid a bounty and a generous salary through non-accountable Special Branch funds. Then the pseudo teams had to make a difficult decision. Could they trust the ex-insurgent or not? It meant putting their lives into the hands of a former enemy who might turn a second time and betray them. The record shows that they rarely made an error of trust.

Initially, the experimental teams generated a lot of intelligence from the African population but no contacts with actual terrorists. On 31 August 1973 the first contact resulting in multiple kills occurred. Thousands more were to follow. As a result of the teams’ successes, it was decided to form the Selous Scouts Regiment, whose mission was the clandestine elimination of terrorists both inside and beyond the borders of Rhodesia. As cover, word was put around that it was a unit of elite combat trackers. In truth, it impersonated terrorists and deployed turned insurgents (administered and looked after by a small number of Special Branch members, whose task was kept secret from the rest of Special Branch, the police, the army and, above all, the press). Command of the Scouts was entrusted to Major Ron Reid-Daly, a talented leader who had risen through the ranks from trooper to regimental sergeant major to commissioned officer and was capable of considerable innovation and lateral thinking. However, he had never commanded African soldiers, and after almost ten years of Bush War, the Rhodesian African Rifles were never able to match the results in insurgent kills achieved by the all-white units of the regular army.

In his book Pamwe Chete The Legend of the Selous Scouts, which is the source of the abridged quotations in this note, Reid-Daly relates how he met with the two surviving leaders of the most successful experimental teams: “I told both men that a complete regiment was about to be formed as a result of their experimental work, using the pseudo concept. Their success had proved that we were on the right track. Both were absolutely delighted to hear the news. I then outlined my plans for the recruitment and training of the new regiment, and in passing expressed extreme disappointment at the [bad-mouthing gossip that was circulating in the army about the poor performance of the soldiers of the Rhodesian African Rifles.] To my absolute astonishment both Stretch Franklin and Basil Moss immediately jumped to the defence of the Rhodesian African Rifles soldiers, expressing surprise and anger. ‘Sure there had been a few misfits and old soldiers from the Rhodesian African Rifles who’d thought they were transferring to a cushy number. We soon weeded them out and now we have nothing left but first-class material, in fact, second to none,’ said Stretch Franklin. ‘I don’t know where you got that bull from, sir,’ said Basil Moss, ’but all I can say is that I have been very proud to share a roof with them.’… It was bought home to me time and again that the qualities of a soldier have nothing to do with the colour of his skin, but rather the man himself, his training and above all the leadership provided to him.”

A ‘Celebrity Appearance’ during the Selous Scouts Selection Course
Reid-Daly introduced the first of his many innovations, a two-part course designed to select and train complete 30-man Troops (including 25 Africans) from well over 160 volunteers, through an exceptionally hard programme of physical training, marksmanship, bush-craft and tracking. “The catalyst would be the selection course, and on that course colour, rank and racial differences would count for nought. The abilities of each individual person would be proved beyond doubt by an arduous and demanding selection course. This thereafter would be the criterion by which each man who passed would regard his fellow Selous Scouts… By the end of the selection course’s first week we were down to about half of those who had volunteered… The basic course ended with a final four-day endurance exercise. We ensured that they were subjected to a maximum amount of physical exertion, while allowing them little food or sleep… The time had now arrived for the African element on the course to be apprised of the true nature of the regiment’s task and get the final phase of their selection course under way. Stretch Franklin, Basil Moss, Corporals Martin Chikondo, Lameck Chiyaka and two tame ZANLA insurgents had meanwhile arrived, as scheduled, but were kept out of sight. For me this was the moment of truth. At this stage we simply could not afford anyone backing out and, once back with his unit, spreading the news as to what our true role was…”

Reid-Daly told those who had passed Phase One: “You will not become, as you had believed, the Army trackers. Instead, we are going to turn you into insurgents. You are going to be far better freedom fighters than the real ones. You will have to be good because your lives will depend on just how good you are. You will pretend to be ZANLA or ZIPRA insurgents and infiltrate the population. You will infiltrate the circles of the insurgent sympathisers and form your own networks, and you will try to edge your way into the actual insurgent groups themselves.” There was a stunned silence and I called for Basil Moss and the others to come in. Basil Moss introduced the men with him [including Chiyaka] and then, in pure and fluent Shona, spoke to them at some length, spelling out the tasks relating to the experimental teams, telling of the teams’ experiences, their successes, their problems, and of those who had already died. I watched the faces of his audience. They were absolutely spellbound and I knew that in spite of all the obstructions put in my way by the Commanding Officer of the Rhodesian African Rifles, and some of the staff at Army Headquarters, the Selous Scouts had won the day... we were now in a position to have 2 Troop, the first of the Troops, operational by 2 January 1974…

“Being finally satisfied that everything was in hand and on schedule, I drove to [the selection and training base] and found the situation there highly satisfactory too. 2 Troop’s pseudo training was on the brink of completion and the instructors were well satisfied with the calibre of the men and the high standard of training achieved. Their view was that the new men should be deployed into the operational area with experienced men of the experimental teams in command positions. This would mean that the new men would not have to gain experience the hard way, with the very real risk of compromise and exposure. They would have experienced men to guide and lead them. I agreed with them despite my original intention of keeping most of the experimental teams together in 1 Troop.” Accordingly, Lameck Chiyaka was posted to be a Corporal in 2 Troop, effective 2 January 1974.

A junior commander in 2 Troop, Selous Scouts and a Bronze Cross of Rhodesia “for courage and initiative”
Reid-Daly describes some of the early Selous Scouts operations. Many were successes, some failures, but lessons were learned. Above all, Reid-Daly was able to validate another of his game-changing innovations, a force-multiplying concept of using patrols from 2 Troop to locate groups of insurgents and then call in and direct by radio a Fireforce of troop-carrying and gunship helicopters which would envelop and destroy all the terrorists. Since the Scouts’ guiding was covert, they could preserve their cover with locals and continue operating in the same area. It proved to be a great success and became the Scouts’ standard operating procedure, but by May 1974 Reid-Daly felt that “2 Troop had been experiencing difficulties for many and varied reasons. The insurgents could not understand why they had been suffering such a rise in casualties. They knew that somehow it involved a security breakdown, so they immediately introduced measures to tighten up their security. Before, they had openly strutted about during daytime within the Tribal Trust Lands. They now moved carefully – and only at night. It suddenly became common for [2 Troop] to have to endure the agonised screams of tribesmen who were being murdered or mutilated by the terrorists, either because they were suspected of being informers, or as a means to cow the locals by terror… I told 2 Troup to detach a small section and send them eastwards out of the troop area. I needed to know if we could establish the precise eastern limit of ZANLA insurgent infiltration. Lance-Corporal Lameck Chiyaka soon made contact with the chairman of the local ZANU party in the Pungwe Tribal Trust Land, who was quite delighted to welcome him and his men. To Lameck’s satisfaction, he immediately undertook to introduce them to a ZANLA reconnaissance group, which was busy preparing the ground for a large-scale incursion towards the end of 1974.”

The precise details of the encounter are set out in the citation for Chiyaka’s Bronze Cross. Reid-Daly recounts the subsequent events: “During this fracas, Andrew, one of our first tame insurgents, was killed, and two soldiers wounded. Lameck took his patrol to a nearby kopje and reported by radio what had occurred. I instructed Lameck to leave Andrew’s body where it was in the village and to order the villages to bury it. I then arranged for a security force patrol to helicopter to the village the next morning to investigate the shooting heard during the night. This was duly done and the patrol recovered all the bodies without compromising the Selous Scouts. Lameck told the villagers afterwards that Hope Zichirira’s group were not genuine ZANLA freedom fighters, but renegades who had deserted the cause and turned their hands to armed robbery. This story, which was credible and thus believed, enabled us to again deploy Lameck in that area without creating any problems… by the end of May, after only five months of operating, 100 ZANLA insurgents had been killed or captured as a direct result of Selous Scouts pseudo teams locating, fixing and indicating targets to Fireforces.”

“Little was expected to come of it…”
In December 1974 Reid-Daly tasked Chiyaka to take two men and investigate possible activity by the Matabele ZIPRA terrorists of Joshua Nkomo within the Omay Tribal Trust Land on the shore of Lake Kariba. His expectations were that there was not much to discover, but Chiyaka triumphed, thoroughly infiltrating a terrorist cell. To Reid-Daly’s astonishment, “By the end of the operation we had captured three hard-core ZIPRA insurgents and a further 37 that had been locally trained, and located a large cache of stores, weapons, ammunition and canned food. The three captured hard-core insurgents were turned to our cause and almost immediately put to work in another small operation, during which we killed two more hard-core insurgents and located another base stuffed with weapons, mines and ammunition. Using these tame insurgents as fronts, our operators soon wheedled out from the locals that another three groups of nine ZIPRA insurgents each, 27 in all, had crossed the lake by boat. They were in the process of setting up another network in the Omay, in preparation for a major ZIPRA incursion from Zambia. Once we started to kill them by bringing a Fireforce, the groups splintered. Of major interest was the capture of a military radio of Russian manufacture, which had been used to maintain communications with ZIPRA headquarters in Zambia.”
The Bush War grew in scope and intensity, Reid-Daly continued to innovate and in August 1975 the Selous Scouts began military parachute training, a skill which up until then had been strictly reserved for the all-white Special Air Service. “The high potential of the African as a Special Force soldier had been overlooked. There is no doubt that in the Selous Scouts [80% of which was African] we proved conclusively by results that well-trained and good African soldiers often had tremendous advantages in the African context over their white comrades in the Special Force role. For reasons already outlined it is impossible for a European to successfully imitate an African. It was obvious that we would soon have to cross into neighbouring hostile countries to perform Special Forces tasks. I knew that the time had come to ensure our African soldiers received the right training so that when this time came, the Selous Scouts would match or surpass the boldness and effectiveness of the best anywhere.” Lameck Chiyaka was awarded Selous Scouts para wings, No 26 (the numbering indicated the seniority in the regiment of those serving in September 1978). This was out of a total of about 450 men who passed the military parachute course and met Reid-Daly’s stringent qualification requirements.

“You have had enough warnings…” - The Legion of Merit for “a tremendous coup, superbly executed”
Over the next five years, Chiyaka took part in several daring and audacious deep-penetration strikes on ZANLA bases far inside Mozambique. He also played an important role in persuading soldiers of the Rhodesian African Rifles to volunteer for the Selous Scouts. At least a dozen of the hundred men who enlisted in the RAR immediately after Chiyaka joined the Selous Scouts. The high point of his service, after he had been promoted to Colour Sergeant, was a spectacularly audacious raid into Botswana on Easter weekend 1979, in which he commanded the snatch group. Full details are set out in his MLM citation. Reid-Daly provides a little more colour: “The Land Rovers [expertly disguised as Shortland armoured patrol vehicles donated to Botswana by Britain] pulled up outside the closed gates of the ZIPRA Headquarters, and one of the drivers arrogantly leaned on his hooter. After some minutes a bleary-eyed, unarmed ZIPRA sentry came out and blinked at them curiously. Colour Sergeant Lameck Chiyaka, Member of the Legion of Merit and holder of the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia, who was disguised as a lieutenant in the Botswana Defence Force, glared down at him from the turret of the leading Shortland armoured car. ‘Open the gate!’ he ordered. ’Who are you?’ the sentry asked nervously. ‘Can’t you see we are the Botswana Defence Force?’ The sentry came to attention, giving a poor salute with his clenched fist, opened the gate and helpfully ushered the little convoy into the enclosed area. Lameck Chiyaka rapped smartly on the front door. The lights went on and a man rubbing sleep from his eyes opened the door. ‘Who is in charge here?’ snarled Lameck Chiyaka. Chiyaka studied Makapesi Tshuma with some interest. He knew about him. He knew that under his pillow he would find an AKM machine-gun with a folding butt. ‘We have just had an incident with your freedom fighters,’ said Colour Sergeant Lameck Chiyaka.’They have shot one of our Botswana Defence Force soldiers, and we suspect you have got weapons inside this house. Possession of weapons is against the law of Botswana. You people have been told often enough that, under no circumstances, are you allowed to carry weapons inside our country.’ He took Makapesi Tshuma with him and personally searched his quarters. In moments he produced the AKM with a flourish of triumph. ‘You have had enough warnings,’ hissed Lameck Chiyaka. ‘Now you are under arrest. You are all under arrest. You are all coming back with me to the Botswana Defence Force Barracks!’ More pseudo Botswana Defence Force soldiers entered the house and soon all 17 occupants, including two trained female insurgents, were handcuffed and led meekly to the trucks. The house was then thoroughly searched and a huge quantity of loose documents gathered up, including a filing cabinet containing bulky bundles of lists noting the names and details of every tribal sympathiser who had helped in the networks throughout Matabeleland since the early days of ZIPRA’s inception. After a fruitful hour and a half combing through everything in the house, the Scouts got into their vehicles and drove out of Francistown. It was a tremendous coup superbly executed. Colour Sergeant Lameck Chiyaka and those of his men involved in the actual deception were outstanding. Their coolness and thoroughly convincing threats and accusations had totally cowed the ZIPRA staff at the house. We captured the entire ZIPRA command for the Southern Front, except a few minor officials, plus an archive that was used to deal the ZIPRA war effort in Matabeleland a shattering blow.”

The End
The Selous Scouts were officially credited by Rhodesian Combined Operations Headquarters for facilitating the deaths of 68% of all insurgents killed inside Rhodesia during the Bush War. When the war ended in 1980, the Selous Scouts were disbanded by the simple expedient of ordering them to return to their original parent units. It is doubtful that Lameck Chiyaka ever returned to the RAR. Like Ron Reid-Daly and many other former Scouts, he moved to South Africa. When Lameck Chiyaka was last heard of, he was volunteering as a district secretary in the Pretoria area for the Movement for Democratic Change, the opposition party in Zimbabwe.