The Brian Ritchie Collection of H.E.I.C. and British India Medals

The historic and poignant campaign pair to Major G. F. Blackwood, Royal Horse Artillery, Commanding “E” Battery “B” Brigade at the battle of Maiwand, wounded early in the day and later killed in action in the walled garden where the last stand of the 66th Foot was fought

(a) India General Service 1854-94, 1 clasp, Looshai (2nd Capt. G. F. Blackwood, Peshawur Mountn. By.)

(b) Afghanistan 1878-80, no clasp (Maj. G. F. Blackwood, E. Batt. B. Bde. R.H.A.) the pair contained in an old ebonised display frame with silver label inscribed ‘Major G. F. Blackwood, R.H.A., Maiwand July 27th 1880’, the second with minor official correction to second initial, otherwise extremely fine
£7000-9000

This lot was sold as part of a special collection, The Brian Ritchie Collection of H.E.I.C. and British India Medals.

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‘Captain Blackwood and officers R.A. nobly sustained the reputation of the corps. The word “difficulty” was unknown to them.’ Shadbolt adds: ‘A report drawn up by Blackwood on the Artillery in the campaign contained many valuable suggestions as to the nature of the gun most suitable for such service, and on the management of artillery and the equipment of elephants in mountain, jungle, and morass campaigning; and was printed and published by the Government of India.’ For his services in the expedition, Blackwood was rewarded in September 1872 with a Brevet Majority.

Blackwood next commanded a horse artillery battery in the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Hills, C.B., in England, and, promoted to a regimental Majority in 1876, exchanged into ‘G’ Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A., which he brought to such a state of efficiency as to excite ‘the approbations of the highest military authorities in India’. In February 1878, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge remarked that the battery was ‘in a very high state of efficiency: Major Blackwood highly commended’. In the summer of 1878, Blackwood repaired to Europe on account of his health, and was thus prevented from taking part in the first campaign of the Second Afghan War. He was nevertheless pleased to learn that G/3 had been selected for active service with Roberts’ Kurram Valley Field Force, in spite of a devastating outbreak of Ludiana’s disease amongst the battery’s horses.

On his return to India he was appointed to the command of ‘E’ Battery, ‘B’ Brigade, R.H.A., consisting of six other officers, 164 men, 200 horses, and six 9-pounder guns, at Kirkee. On 16 January 1880, he proceeded with the battery on active service to Kandahar, marching first to Bombay, whence it took ship to Karachi and was conveyed by rail to Nari, where it was halted for nearly six weeks awaiting transport. On leaving Nari the battery marched through the Bolan Pass to Quetta which it reached on 25 March, before proceeding to Kandahar where it arrived on 5 April 1880. On 4 July E/B marched with the brigade group under the overall command of Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows to support local troops under the Wali of Kandahar ,taking to the field in consequence of Ayub Khan’s approach from Herat. Burrows’ force consisted of a cavalry brigade under Brigadier-General Nuttall, comprising E/B, 3rd Scinde Horse, and 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry; and an infantry brigade, comprising 66th (Berkshire) Regiment, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, and 30th Jacob’s Rifles.

On 14 July when the Wali’s troops mutinied at Girishk on the left bank of the Helmand River opposite the British line of march, Blackwood was immediately ordered to get his guns over in support of Nuttall’s cavalry. After a difficult passage and a laborious pursuit which involved digging ramps for the guns so that they could be got over innumerable irrigation ditches he caught up with Nuttall, who immediately ordered him to bring the four guns that were clear into action against the mutineers’ six smooth-bore guns at a range of 1,800 yards - at the start of the action, about 1 p.m., the last two guns were still struggling forward under Lieutenant Hector Maclaine (qv). An artillery duel of half an hour’s duration followed, and Blackwood was afterwards able to write, in what was to be his last letter home, that he ‘got into action four times, and did a fair amount of execution’. A Corporal of the battery told his folks, ‘One shell dropped close to the Major, but he stood his ground and gave his words of command the same as if we were on the field of drill without shot or shell flying about ... There is not a man in the whole Battery but what would go through fire and water for a Commander like the Major.’

The action ended with Burrows’ force in possession of the smooth-bores which were formed into an additional battery under Burrows’ orderly officer, Captain Slade, R.A., and manned by soldiers from the 66th Foot under the guidance of a few Gunners from E/B. Late on the evening of 26 July Burrows decided to march early next day on the strategically important village of Maiwand and eject a number of tribesmen who were holding it for Ayub Khan and his army. Preparations for the move caused considerable grumbling amongst the Native Infantry units who missed their breakfasts as a result of mismanagement by the commissariat staff. The British units appear to have fared better, for their officers made no complaints in their subsequent reports about the condition in which their men left camp. It was the same in the case of the cavalry, whose quartermasters were accustomed to early patrols departing daily before first light. ‘E’ Battery, too, had no trouble. After the skirmish with the mutineers at Girishk Blackwood had written that thirst was a ‘caution’, and it appears that he had taken prompt steps to ensure that his battery was not caught out again by a sudden change of plan.

The force marched, headed by a troop of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry thrown out as skirmishers in front a squadron of the same regiment, with a troop of the Scinde horse on its left and fifty sabres of the latter regiment on its right. At a short distance behind Lieutenant Maclaine’s division of two guns followed. Behind them came Nuttall, Blackwood and the staff, followed by Lieutenant Fowell’s division of E/B, flanked by two squadrons of the Bombay Cavalry. The infantry covered the advance of Slade’s smooth-bore battery in the centre, with the Bombay Grenadiers in column on the extreme left, and between them and the guns, a half a company of Sappers and Miners. On the extreme right of the smooth-bores was the baggage, which was protected on its right by the Khushk-i-Nakhud River. Next in from the baggage came the 66th Foot in column and Jacob’s Rifles also in column. The baggage guard drawn from the 66th followed directly behind it. The rearguard was made up of Lieutenant Osborne’s division of E/B and a squadron of the Scinde Horse.

Intelligence now reached Burrows that Ayub with 6,000 regular infantry, 4,000 regular cavalry, thirty guns, and anything up to 20,000 ghazis, was marching across his front in a race to Maiwand, away to the north east. Burrows knew that he must attack as his only means of diverting Ayub Khan’s advance. At about 10.30 the advance guard of cavalry, moving to the left to avoid the village Mundabad in case it was occupied, began to get engaged with the leading units of Ayub’s army on the plain beyond the Mundabad Ravine, which ran along the north side of the village towards Khig. As Burrows was giving orders for Nuttall to ride forward with his cavalry and reconnoitre Mundabad, Blackwood, according to E/B’s Veterinary-Surgeon, said to the General, “I had better go forward to the edge of that village and open fire.” In due course he moved up with Nuttall, taking Lieutenant Fowell’s division with him and made his crossing near the village, but realising it would take some time to get the guns over at this point he was heard saying to Maclaine, “I cross here, you cross further down.”

‘Blackwood moved forward with Nuttall, and Fowell led his division over the edge of the ravine. The detachment commanders carefully picked a way for their guns and wagons. It was easier than they had expected, the down slope was fairly steep but the ground held well together, The stocky little wheel-horses strained back almost on their haunches in the breeching of their special harness, to hold back their limbers and guns, sliding down with a cascade of sand and stones, hooves ploughing great, dusty furrows in the yellow earth as they disputed every step against the thrust of their limber-poles ... reaching the broad sand and gravel bed of the ravine, the brakes were freed, the gunners remounted. Numbers One, the detachment commanders, called their teams forward, drivers kicked their mounts into a trot, slapped whips over the necks of their lead horses and went for the opposite slope at a trot. Some quick whip-work, hoarse cries of threat and encouragement, and the division was over the brow, wheels crunching comfortably over the hard earth and pebble surface.’

‘The smooth plain ran gently upwards, north to the skyline a mile ahead where the ground was dotted with Afghans of Ayub Khan’s cavalry screen, a motley collection of regular troopers and the mounted tribesmen, their drab greys and khakis relieved by the occasional red or green jacket of some dandy, a well-to-do farmer’s son or a petty chieftain. Several hundred horsemen could be distinguished, and many others faded dimly into the mirage over the top of the convex slope. On the command “Action Front!” the gun teams wheeled and halted, horseholders grabbed their detachments’ mounts and cantered away with them to the rear. Trail-eyes were jerked free by sweating gunners. “Drive on!” they yelled, and the teams trotted off to the wagon-lines, as gun-detachments heaved their trails around until muzzles faced the enemy. The noise and dust subsided, the hoof-beats died away and a sudden silence fell as the Numbers One listened for their next orders. Then the two guns belched a salvo, and again, but it was no use - visibility was too poor by far for seeing whether any damage had been done to the Afghans, or even for observing the fall of shot. All that could be said was that the enemy were drifting slowly back into the haze, which was the last thing that Blackwood wanted, knowing that he must goad the Afghan main force to give battle without delay.

“I must get much nearer!” he cried to Nuttall. And almost before the cavalry brigade commander had given his assent he found himself and his escort galloping after Blackwood, northward up the gradient. Behind came Fowell, terrain like a parade ground, no obstacles for his division to avoid - then the teams and their guns flying smoothly over this surface, exhilarated gunners riding escort. Cavalry matched artillery, riding protection on both sides, while the forward screen spurred frantically to keep ahead of Blackwood.’

Topping the slope Blackwood was presented with a view extending nearly three miles across the plain of Maiwand. Between the entrance to the Garmao Valley on the left and the village of Maiwand, squatting on the road that led to the Khakrez Valley and Kandahar, on the right, he could see the dark masses of Ayub’s infantry, the nearest only a mile and a half away at ideal artillery fighting range. Unconcerned by the lack of cover and no longer bothered with reconnaissance, Blackwood ordered his two guns into action, with no consideration other than to make the enemy react. ‘He realized that he would need every gun that he could get, and asked Nuttall for Osborne’s division of E/B to be called forward from the rearguard, and for the smooth-bore battery as well. Nutall agreed. He was fully aware that he wanted more guns; and not only guns, but infantry - in a hurry! If this strategem worked, Ayub Khan’s whole army would converge upon him. Besides, he could now see large numbers of men dressed in the white battle-garb of the ghazi sallying forth from Maiwand to take him in the flank if he was not careful. So he sent his orderly officer ... hurrying back down to towards Mundabad to urge these requests upon the force commander.’

Maclaine, meanwhile, having seeing the mass of the enemy, was dashing forward on to the left of the plain to engage them at audaciously close range. This was the sight that pre-occupied Burrows when he first came up, and he sent a galloper to order him back. Blackwood, equally startled by Maclaine’s boldness, exclaimed, “Those guns are going much too far to the left!” and sent a trumpeter to recall him. At length Maclaine returned to the battery. It was about 11 a.m. when Blackwood opened fire from his final position, and at about quarter past when the steadily advancing Afghan guns replied. For three quarters of an hour the artillery duel continued with neither side making much impression on the other. On the British side this was attributed to the skill with which the Afghans had chosen their positions and poor visibilty brought about by swirling dust and heat haze.

Gradually the Afghans advanced creeping forward in groups, making good use of the ground. On the British left the Afghan horse massed threateningly and in the centre the tribal cavalry hovered, screening the targets which Blackwood sought. A nullah running parallel with the right of the British position had unaccountably been left unoccupied by Burrows, and it became the temporary shelter of thousands of ghazis not more than two hundred and fifty yards from the 66th Foot’s firing line on the right of the British position. Burrows’ line gradually bent to conform to the enemy’s encroachments so that both wings were thrown back, and E/B’s gun line was between the Bombay Grenadiers and Jacob’s Rifles. The ground between the three divisions of E/B was held by the half company of Sappers and Miners.

At half past one the smooth-bores ran out of ammunition. Slade was convinced there was more in the wagons with the baggage at Mundabad, but the rest of their battle supply had been thrown into the Helmand, near Girishk, abandoned through lack of transport. He sent three officers to bring up more but none could find any, and he then took the extraordinary step of ordering the battery to the rear to collect what there was, if any, and come back into action on the left. It has since been said that the withdrawal of the smooth-bores had the most disastrous psychological effect on the Native Infantry.

Shortly before the withdrawal of the smooth-bores, the full effect of the Afghan artillery began to be felt in the firing line, and the steady flow of casualties to the rear was increased by many unwounded men who left the line in search of water. At about this time Blackwood was hit in the thigh by a bullet but was none the less seen continuing ‘to work his guns until he could do no more.’ When the effort became too much to bear, he gave command of the battery to Slade and retired a short distance to have his wound dressed at one of the Regimental Aid Posts. But when he realised that the attention he needed could not be obtained any closer than the Field Hospital, in the bed of the Mundabad Ravine, he returned to the line to sit behind the 66th Foot to help them judge ranges. About an hour later when the battle reached its climax with the ghazis making their unstoppable charge, Blackwood found that his wound prevented him from mounting his horse, and somewhere near one of the R.A.P.’s, ‘realising the gravity of the situation he gave his field glasses to a Jemadar of the cavalry and ordered him to ride immediately to Kandahar to warn General Primrose of the fate that had overcome the brigade, and to produce the field glasses as a token of the authenticity of the message.’

Abandoning his charger, Blackwood made his way back to his friends in the 66th Foot and joined them in their gallant fighting withdrawal to Khig. Before he reached the village, however, his wound broke out afresh, and Lieutenant Pearce of the 66th, in one of the remarkable acts of selflessness that marked the retreat, stopped to help him bind it up. He struggled on into the ravine and up the other side, where a determined stand was made. Falling back again he limped to the scene of the next stand, survived, and fell back to the walled garden where the last stand of the 66th was fought. And there, in the last garden before the open plain, he was killed - his body afterwards being left exposed with the other dead until the approach of a punitive column under General Daubney several weeks later induced the local villagers to bury them with the minimum of effort where they had fallen. The shallow graves were opened by Daubney’s men, and Blackwood’s remains were identified by Captain Slade, who arranged for a small tomb to be built over the place nearby where he was reburied.

Refs: E/B R.H.A. at Maiwand, R.A. Journal, Vol LV, No. 3 (Latham); My God Maiwand, Operations of the South Afghanistan Field Force 1878-80 (Maxwell); The Second Afghan War (Hanna); The Afghan Campaign of 1878-1880 (Shadbolt).